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  Jonathan A. Neufeld
Abstract
Musical formalism, which strictly limits the type of thing any
description of the music can tell us, is ill-equipped to account for
contemporary performance practice. If performative interpretations
are in a position to tell us something about musical works—that is if
performance is a kind of description, as Peter Kivy argues—then we
have to loosen the restrictions on notions of musical relevance to
make sense of performance. I argue that musical formalism, which
strictly limits the type of thing any description of the music can tell
us, is inconsistent with Kivy's quite compelling account of
performance. This shows the difficulty that actual performances pose
to overly rigid conceptions of music. Daniel Barenboim's
unannounced performance of Wagner in Israel in 2001 shows that
the problem of the boundaries of musical relevance is no mere
philosophical puzzle. It is a pressing problem in the musical public
sphere.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
In Music Alone Peter Kivy makes a peculiar, but compelling claim. He
suggests that performative interpretations can give an account of
music that, in some sense, bridges the divide between performative
and critical interpretations noted by Richard Wollheim, Jerrold
Levinson, and others. Kivy writes that "it is no paradox to say that
performance is the ultimate nonverbal description of the work… I
write of the listener's understanding; and that understanding, in the
performer, is evinced most fully, most characteristically, in the
nonverbal description that we call his or her interpretation—which is
to say performance—of the musical work."[1] That is, in some sense
a performance of a work is the best way for us to come to know a
work, to discover its various properties. I will argue that the
formalism of Peter Kivy, which strictly limits the type of thing any
description of the music can tell us, is inconsistent with his quite
compelling account of performance. This inconsistency has
implications that reach far beyond Kivy's exemplary account. It
shows the difficulty that public performance poses to overly rigid
conceptions of music. I will anchor my arguments in what I take to
be a particularly rich example: Daniel Barenboim's recent
performance of Wagner in Israel. This is the sort of hard case that
clearly shows that the problem of the boundaries of musical
relevance is no mere philosophical puzzle. It is very much alive as a
problem in what I will call the musical public sphere.
2. Wagner in Israel
On July 7, 2001 Daniel Barenboim conducted the Prelude to
Wagner's Tristan und Isolde as an unannounced encore at the Israel
festival in Jerusalem. There has been an unofficial ban on, or what
Barenboim prefers to call a "taboo" against, the public performance
of Wagner's music in Israel. The ban had its origin in the Palestine

Symphony Orchestra's cancellation of its performance of the Prelude
to Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg in November of 1938. The
cancellation was a direct response to the November progrom, which
was euphemistically named "Kristallnacht" by Walter Funk, Chairman
of the Nazi's Committee on Economic Policy, and Hitler's Personal
Economic Advisor. The Palestine Symphony's refusal to perform
Wagner and the general ban that followed served as a public
condemnation of the racism of the Nazis.
In the years that followed, Wagner, as well as composers who were
thought to have collaborated with the Nazis (Richard Strauss and
Karl Orff in particular), were completely excluded from public
concerts.[2] While, interestingly, prime-time radio broadcasts helped
slowly to lift the bans on public performances of Strauss and Orff in
the 70s and 80s, the ban on Wagner has remained quite strong. It is
well known that Wagner was the favorite composer of Hitler, and
that Wagner's music was used prominently in propaganda events.
Die Meistersinger was played at the Nürnberg rallies and countless
other Nazi events, including several of Hitler's birthday celebrations
in the thirties. Wagner's own nationalistic and anti-Semitic leanings
are also well known from his essays and, though this is a more
controversial claim, from the content of some of his operas.[3]
In 1981, Zubin Mehta attempted to perform an excerpt from Tristan
und Isolde unannounced and was stopped by the noisy intervention
of the audience. For the 2001 Festival concert, Barenboim was
originally scheduled to perform the first act of Die Walküre.
However, protests by survivors of the camps as well as reservations
expressed by the Israeli government led the festival authorities to
ask Barenboim for an alternative program. Barenboim agreed to
cancel Wagner and play Schumann's Fourth Symphony and
Stravinsky's The Rite of Spring instead. The night of the
performance Barenboim turned to the audience and told them that,
as an encore, he would like to perform the Prelude of Wagner's
Tristan und Isolde. He told the audience, as Mehta had, that
anybody who did not want to hear it could leave. A 30 minute
debate ensued where several people did leave, some noisily
slamming doors and yelling "Juden raus!" the cry of the Nazi soldiers
purging the ghettos of Europe. Nearly all of the remaining audience
members gave Barenboim and the Berlin Staatskapelle a standing
ovation after the encore.
The performance ignited a firestorm of debate. Conservative
politicians responded with varying levels of vehemence. Then prime
minister Ariel Sharon commented that he wished the work had not
been played. Ehud Olmert, then mayor of Jerusalem, said that
Barenboim's actions were "brazen, arrogant, uncivilized and
insensitive" and that he had committed "cultural rape… It is not his
job to determine whether the state of Israel decides to allow
Wagner to be heard or not. As a musician he is great, but as a
human being I could say a few other things."[4] Zvulun Orlev the
chairman of the committee on education and culture argued that
Barenboim "should be declared a cultural 'persona non grata'"—that
he should be banned from performing in Israel until he apologizes
for his offense.[5] Finally, Barenboim was officially rebuked by
members of the Israeli parliament.
3. Performance, Criticism, and Philosophy
But does any of this tell us anything about how Barenboim actually
performed Tristan? Does it tell us anything about his performative
interpretation—his "account of the music"? I think it does, and I

think nearly everybody who commented on the controversy,
including Barenboim, would agree. To my knowledge, nobody has
argued that all of this talk of politics is to miss the point of a
performance, or to bring in outside considerations—extra-musical
concerns—to criticize Barenboim's program choice. If one were to
review the performance and not mention that it was Wagner being
performed in Israel and instead merely give the usual descriptive
and evaluative account of the event focusing on the quality of the
playing, the shaping of particular phrases, the quality of tone color,
and so on, it would either be a deeply inadequate review, not giving
a full account of the performance, or it would be making a point.
One might respond that, since all reviewing is interest-relative, I am
here picking out one interest among many possible ones. It is
possible that a hardened reviewer could have ignored everything but
the sound structure of the work, or that another reviewer for a
fashion magazine might have focused only on the outfits of the
audience and performers. While it is true that interest is relative, it
is my contention that any reviewer interested in the performance
could not have ignored these factors. This seems uncontroversial. I
am also claiming that any reviewer interested in the performative
interpretation, a Wagner specialist interested in examining ways of
interpreting Tristan, for example, could not ignore the political
backdrop and the preconcert actions of Barenboim. This is, of
course, more controversial. But I take it that any music reviewer of
performances would be interested in these two things. Further, any
music reviewer who had an interest in filtering out the political
properties of the performance would either need to do so explicitly,
and so be taking sides in the controversy and not really filtering it
out, or would perform this argument with a silence that, in the
context, could only be conspicuous.[6]
The point that such a review might be making is that any properties
of the event in question, unless they have something to do with the
sounding of the music itself, are irrelevant to a description of the
performance or a criticism of it as music. The music itself is, in the
words of Eduard Hanslick, simply "tonally moving forms," where
everything else is merely extra.[7] One interested in making this
argument could easily use the language of Peter Kivy's formalism
that he so clearly sets out in Music Alone, or any number of articles
in New Essays on Musical Understanding, or The Fine Art of
Repetition. For example, in a "A New Music Criticism,"[8] Kivy joins
musicologist Joseph Kerman in the call for a music criticism that
moves beyond mere analysis, arguing that those who focus merely
on technical description miss out on emotional properties that are
essential to the work. Those who limit themselves to the purportedly
dry technical language of music theory, though they wisely avoid the
florid programmatic descriptions of the nineteenth century, end up
throwing the emotional baby out with the extramusical bath water.
However, Kivy emphasizes that it is crucial that the critic not go too
far, sliding from proper criticism to what Kivy calls "interpretational
criticism," which ought assiduously to be avoided. To interpret is to
find meaning, and Kivy claims that in music there is no meaning to
be found. Any description of music must be limited to calling
attention to syntactical properties[9], and must not introduce a nonexistent semantics.
Where does this leave performative interpretation? In Music Alone,
Kivy writes,
[I]t is no paradox to say that performance is the
ultimate nonverbal description of the work… I write of

the listener's understanding; and that understanding, in
the performer, is evinced most fully, most
characteristically, in the nonverbal description that we
call his or her interpretation—which is to say
performance—of the musical work.[10]
That is, in some sense a performance of a work is the best way for
us to come to know a work, to discover its various properties.[11]
Presumably performances, as the "ultimate non-verbal description"
of works of music, fall under the same formalist restriction with
regard to semantics. Any interpretational performance must provide
a false description of the work—it is a bad performance, or perhaps
even a non-performance, if a performance is necessarily of the
music. So, any performance would be inappropriate or in some
sense false if it "ascribed" to the work semantic properties.
If ever there was a case of injection of extra-musical meaning into a
work, arguing about the politics of the performance setting of a
Wagner prelude would seem to be an example—the absurdity of a
purely syntactic political predicate is manifest. We should be careful
not to be misled by the presence of words in the actual opera. In
fact, it seems that Barenboim chose his program carefully in order
to make a justification for performing Wagner easier. He could have
chosen the Prelude to Meistersinger, making his opponents'
arguments easier and even, perhaps, agreeable to formalism. After
all, the content of the words of Meistersinger is more easily argued
to be politically offensive, dragging the music along with it. Tristan,
though, is less obviously worrisome even in its lyrics and the Prelude
is one of the most formally famous passages in all of music. I will
say something about the significance of Barenboim's choice below.
It would seem that the formalists are compelled to insist on the
same strictness with regard to semantics in the case of a
performance of Wagner in Israel that they show toward descriptions
of musical works in general. The political backdrop of the
performance simply cannot be treated as musically relevant by a
formalist because any properties of a performance for which it would
be responsible would necessarily be semantic. That is, any properties
of a performance event that are brought out by the political
background of that event can not but be extramusical. It is
important to set out this distinction between musical relevance and
irrelevance with a bit more care. For an argument for the essential
musical irrelevance of the political elements of a performance of
Wagner in Israel to work, there must be certain properties that can
make an aesthetic difference and certain properties that cannot. The
argument assumes that there are types of properties of a
performance that can be relevant and types of properties that
cannot.
If it is true that interpretational performance is as illegitimate as
interpretational criticism, it is important to have a clear picture of
what this could mean. How could a formalist who held open the
possibility of critical performances draw a line between an
illegitimate interpretational performance-as-description (Barenboim
conducting Wagner in Israel, Nazis conducting Wagner or Beethoven
for political purposes, unificationists or nationalists in Germany using
Beethoven's Ninth as an anthem) and a legitimate performance-asdescription (a performance of the Ninth in Alice Tully Hall,
Barenboim playing Tristan with the Chicago Symphony in Orchestra
Hall). Of course, for normal verbal descriptions, critical
interpretations in the language of Wollheim and Levinson, formalists

would be happy to set strict, a priori conceptual constraints on the
types of things one might say about the music itself. That is,
formalists allow philosophy to do the conceptual work of dividing the
world into the musical and the non-musical when it comes to writing
about music.
4. Wigs and Politics
It is at this point where Kivy's own astute account of musical
performance practice ought to cause a formalist account of music in
general some difficulty. In a particularly rewarding passage of
Authenticitie, Kivy considers what he dubs "the wig problem." The
question arising from the wig problem is, How does one determine
where aesthetically relevant gesture stops and aesthetically
irrelevant content begins in a performance? Kivy gives an account of
aesthetically relevant, musically relevant—he sensibly collapses the
two when considering appreciation of performance—visual aspects of
performance. He argues that certain visual properties of
performances are indeed musically relevant. How are we to
distinguish between musical gestures and extra-musical content of
performances? He suggests that it is possible in any number of
cases to argue, to give a viable interpretation of the music that
makes extra-score or non-sonic properties musically relevant. But,
he concedes, this relevance is entirely dependent on particular
arguments and local justifications. Kivy steadfastly refuses to set out
criteria of musical relevance with regard to performance—it is
simply not appropriate definitively to set parameters in advance of
actual performances. If one can make a reasonable case for the
aesthetic relevance of some performance choice, he argues, then
that is all there is to it.
It would be helpful to consider in some detail a few of Kivy's own
illuminating examples. At the end of Haydn's Symphony Number 45,
"The Farewell," the musicians stop playing one by one, blowing out
the candles on the stand and leaving with their instruments under
their arms as they do. Kivy gives a compelling argument as to why
the movement is relevant, and why it should be done with candles
instead of electric music stand lights. He argues that blowing out a
candle is a more fluid, graceful movement than snapping off a stand
light and this motion is far more suited to the quiet adagio playing. I
would add that the dramatic effect of extinguishing a flame with
one's breath is far greater than snapping off an electric light, no
matter how smoothly and gracefully one might turn off the light. The
rising smoke dissipating into the air accompanies the player as she
exits the stage, leaving behind a rapidly fading memory. Kivy also
suggests that he would accept that a performance of Mozart's
Coronation Mass in a "candlelit Salzburg Cathedral" is more
"musically authentic" than performing it in the sonic museum of a
contemporary concert hall. This is not to say one should not or can
not perform the work in the sonic museum—there is plenty of pure
music that the work has to give that would allow it to withstand
being played in a modern concert setting. However, playing it in a
more traditional setting like the Salzburg Cathedral brings out
musical properties that would not otherwise be apparent. "I can give
a plausible story about how the structure of the Coronation Mass
and its shining musical surface have been aesthetically fashioned for
ceremonial performance in a place of worship of a certain kind, "
says Kivy.[12]
In each of these examples, elements of visual appearance, the
performers' actions, and the performance context contribute to the

understanding of the music itself. On the one hand, for a
performance to be a legitimate, non-interpretational description on
Kivy's account of musical meaning, the content of this description
must be merely syntactical. As such, it can not amount to very
much in the grand scheme of things. Kivy does not mean this to
denigrate the performer or performance, just as arguing that there
is nothing profound in music is not to denigrate music—it is just to
have a good conceptual grasp of the kind of thing performance or
music is.[13] Profundity is reserved for things with semantic
content, with things capable of telling us something new and deep.
As Kivy has repeatedly insisted, music on its own falls short on all
these counts.[14] On the other hand, coupled with the examples
from Authenticities, the statement that performance is a description
of the work pulls us in the opposite and, I would argue, in a more
appealing direction. In the examples helping to illuminate the wig
problem, it is not only admitted that a number of visual, gestural,
and contextual elements of the performance tell us immediately and
viscerally about the work; they can also expand our understanding
of the work. A wide variety of properties of the performance—sonic
or otherwise—can aid us in refining the identification and evaluations
of the properties of the work itself. That is, properties of many
different types can be musically relevant in a performance. The
"shining musical surface" of the Coronation Mass looks and sounds
quite different in a Salzburg Cathedral and one might learn
something about the work that one could not have otherwise. One
might feel more justified in describing its solemn grandeur as
"opulent," where one may not have before, perhaps settling for
"complex," or "intricate," "densely interwoven," etc. The justification
for the description would in part depend on the performance's
aesthetically working in a particular performance setting along with
the usual technical analytical points about the score. The spareness
of the second movement of the Farewell Symphony becomes much
more poignant and pointed at the end of the last movement. The
musicians getting up and leaving after blowing out the candles while
the music still plays adds another dimension to the emotional
content of the performance that would simply not be there without
the actions.
It might be tempting to argue that I have simply missed the point
by missing a distinction. While the distinction between something
that can be musically relevant and something that cannot be is a
matter of the concept of music, the distinction between musical
relevance and irrelevance of performance choices assumes the
properties at stake have passed conceptual muster. That is, among
the properties that can be relevant, some are in certain
circumstances and some are not. For example, the performer's
wearing wigs can be an aesthetic property—one can imagine a
situation in which it makes an aesthetic difference whether or not
wigs are worn. Similarly, one can imagine situations where blowing
out a candle on the stand is utterly irrelevant. Similar things might
be said about more general scene setting. Whether a work is
performed in a cathedral clearly can be aesthetically relevant. In the
particular case of the Coronation Mass, it is relevant. In the case of
Schumann's Fourth Symphony, it is not. The religious cum political
pomp of the Coronation Mass becomes more prominent and takes on
a particular hue in a cathedral. Imagine it instead in a spare, though
acoustically identical German Lutheran church—the musical surface
still shines, but differently: without the pomp and opulence—perhaps
it is even ironic, or mocking.
In the case of Barenboim's performance, then, one can take three

positions. One might argue that (1) the political surroundings cannot
make an aesthetic difference, that is, they cannot be aesthetic
properties at all, or (2) they can be aesthetic properties but are not
in this case, or (3) they can be and are. The argument I began with,
in the spirit of Kivy's formalism, depended on (1). When Kivy writes
of musical works themselves, he argues that political and moral
matters are necessarily matters of semantic content that music
alone cannot have. Thus they cannot be aesthetic properties of
music, since these properties comprise only formal and syntactic
ones. But Kivy's own arguments give us powerful reasons for
doubting the wisdom of making such categorical judgments in
advance of actual performances. That is, the "plausible story"
criterion of musical relevance in principle leaves open precisely what
properties can be musically relevant. Since it is impossible to rule
anything out, it is possible for anything to be musically relevant. His
arguments about musically relevant performance choices suggest
that the real argument, when we discuss performances, is between
(2) and (3). Of course, certain types of properties may so seldom
present themselves as candidates for musical relevance as to seem
in principle irrelevant. If this is in principle true of performances of
any work, and performances are descriptions of works—that is, they
pick out aesthetically relevant properties of works, then it is
impossible to see how the properties of the work itself can avoid
being subject to the same criterion of relevance. It seems, then, that
Kivy's compelling justifications of musically relevant properties of
performances entangle the content of the performed works in a
widening net of semantically fraught context.
In performances, the bright line between essentially irrelevant
properties and properties that can be relevant dims considerably. In
fact, it seems that there is no principled way of determining just
what will be or can be aesthetically relevant to a given performance.
Recall that whether the Coronation Mass is better performed in a
cathedral depends on an interpretation of the music that was made
for "ceremonial performance in a place of worship of a certain kind."
Note how specific Kivy allows the musical properties to be here:
Ceremonial performance (as opposed to merely formal, say) in a
place of worship (as opposed to any old hall amenable to a certain
level of solemnity) of a particular kind (what kind? Catholic?
opulent?). Kivy is absolutely correct in arguing that such details are
often unavoidable when considering aesthetically relevant
performance choice. Whatever the details of these descriptions, it is
impossible to characterize all of these ever more specific properties
as merely syntactical. Consideration of these details leaves open
questions that it would seem formalism would in other contexts like
to close. More important, if performance is to have the artistic role
that it does for Kivy, these elements cannot be determined in
advance. If a place of worship of a particular kind can count as an
aesthetically relevant factor of a musical performance, again, I see
no principled reason for rejecting a priori that a particular political
context could also be. How fine grained this political context might
be seems to be open to argument by performers and their publics.
5. Generative Context
One might respond that any content open to discussion as musical
content, content of the work itself, in a performance must be
plausibly connected to the generative context of the work.[15] In
the case of Tristan, that the work is performed by Barenboim in
Israel, and that this is politically significant, tells us nothing about
the work—though perhaps it tells us something about Nazis,

Barenboim, and Israel. The reason that the work is left out of this
account is because the performance choice, or performance context,
in this instance is different in kind from that of the Coronation Mass
or the Farewell Symphony. In the latter two cases, the Salzburg
Cathedral and the blowing out of candles are directly connected to
the intentions of the composer and the original context of the work.
This is implied by Kivy, whose plausible story is about how the work
is fashioned in a particular way. The political context of Israel, one
might think, has nothing to do with the generative context of
Tristan. And so, on this account, there is a principled distinction to
be made for musical relevance, and it is this: only something that
can be plausibly connected to the generative context of the work
itself can be musically relevant.
Unfortunately, this response simply begs the question. Barenboim's
performance in Israel is controversial precisely because it there is no
uncontroversially pre-given account of generative context of the
work. In fact, it is controversial precisely because it makes a sort of
claim about it. Moreover, I want to argue that this could be said of
any performance, even though I readily admit that the vast majority
of performances are uncontroversial and the generative context of
the work is not explicitly addressed as a problem. In this sense,
most performances are like the all-too-common "easy cases" in law
that can make legal decisions appear to be automatic and amenable
to formalistic interpretation. Sophisticated arguments against the
performance of Wagner in Israel[16] argue that the music itself
contains the German nationalistic, anti-Semitic content that makes
the music in itself politically and morally repellent.[17] This claim
may well be (and almost always is) justified at least in part by the
generative context of the works in question. Reference to Wagner's
avowed anti-Semitism, the culture of anti-Semitism in which he
wrote, the explicit nationalism in his writings and perhaps even in
works like Meistersinger, are part of what allow those against the
performance of Wagner to identify his work in the way that they do.
That these parts of the generative context have been emphasized
(by Nazis, Israelis, scholars, journalists, and so on) is what is called
into question by Barenboim. His writings as well as his performance
of Tristan argue that this is not how the work should be understood,
that these undeniable elements of the generative context of the work
are not relevant to the identity of the work. On Barenboim's account
of the work, and the generative context relevant to the identification
of its salient properties, those who argue otherwise have simply
been making a mistake. The argument for and against a political
understanding make the same use of generative context, but they
call attention to or emphasize the relevance of different parts of it.
If we take seriously Kivy's account of the performance as description
of the work, and we add that the work is in part determined by its
generative context, then the performance, insofar as it successfully
describes the work, commits itself to a particular understanding of
the work's generative context. This seems odd only on a wrongheaded view about what the generative context is, what can be
settled about it, and how. A full account of what I have in mind here
would take me beyond the scope of this paper, but I believe I can
give an indication of the argument I have in mind.
What it is about that context that is relevant to the identification of
the work is not a simple matter of historical explanation. In hard
cases, how we should appropriately understand history may well be
part of the dispute, rather than the neutral ground on which
decisions of either side can be made. Nazi performers, insofar as

they were coherent, were trying to say something about the work
itself. And, of course, they believed that this would also tell us
something about German character, and a great many other things.
Barenboim's performance of Tristan in Israel was a powerful way of
denying that Wagner's anti-Semitism and nationalism were relevant
to, or perhaps just determinative of, the identity of the work. I am
happy to admit that some connection to the generative context
might be crucially important, or even dispositive in certain cases, in
our investigation of musically relevant performance properties. But
this concession does no harm to my position. If the performance is a
description of the work, an essential aid to our coming to an
understanding of the work, it participates in this very determination.
So the generative context cannot be used as a definitive conceptual
arbiter between disputants over musical relevance in a performance.
6. Barenboim, Tristan, and Meistersinger
What, then, did Barenboim's performance of Tristan in Israel tell his
audience something about Tristan that contributed to their musical
understanding? Among a great many other things, Barenboim's
performance described Tristan und Isolde as not itself politically
repugnant. When asked in a public lecture recently whether he
thought that Tristan had any anti-Semitic content, Barenboim
replied, in effect, "Of course not. I would not perform it if I thought
it did."[18] This may seem quite weak as it stands, but given the
continuing controversy over Wagner in contemporary musicology and
the history of his music's reception in Israel, even this apparently
weak, negative claim ranges wider than one would expect. Of
course, it does seem simply to tell us what the formalist insists was
clear all along. But Barenboim's performance is doing something
more and different from the formalist. His argument functions as an
instance of an argument of form (2) above—political content can be
musically relevant, but a it is not in this case. If he were just making
the general formalist claim that there could be no musically relevant
political content, then Meistersinger would have done the job equally
well, and more shockingly. But he chose Tristan.
Since one of the relevant facts of performance that helps us
understand a performative interpretation is program choice, it may
be helpful to end by considering why Barenboim might have made
this particular choice, and what this might tell us about Tristan.
What a performance of Tristan in Israel highlights better than a
performance of it elsewhere is the nature of the struggle of the
music—it lends it an inflection it might not have had otherwise. In
Tristan, the desire and longing of the lovers bubbles up as a
beautiful and compelling disorder against the externally imposed
social order of the world. The same is true of the individuality,
talent, and artistic genius of Walther in Meistersinger, and the purity
of Siegfried in the Ring cycle. The order of the world stands as a
constraining obstacle to the expression and satisfaction of endless
desire, yearning, longing, talent, true art, and greatness. The
character of each of these obstacles is quite different in each work,
of course, as is the nature of the struggle. Think what happens in
the music of Meistersinger. The music shows a struggle between
free-flowing, easy breathing, vibrant, self-generating, natural
melodies and oppressive, stodgy, archaic, foreign, imposed and
unnatural rules of harmony. After the Prelude, David, the star pupil
of the pedantic wing of the Meistersinger guild, enters with a long,
painful, and tedious aria. Its use of modality sounds archaic (though
it isn't), stodgy, and foreign to the listener. It is finally interrupted
with the opening aria of Walther. Walther's music, of course, is like a

breath of fresh air—gone are the modes, gone is the stodginess, and
in comes free-breathing, natural-sounding singing. As the opera
progresses, of course, the rules and strictures imposed by the guild
are shown to be ridiculous (though we already heard that in the
opening arias) and they are overcome and defeated by Walther who
is ultimately praised to no end by the unified voice of the
community, minus Beckmesser of course. The triumphal univocity of
the great C major chorus at the end of Meistersinger signals
overcoming the stifling old order, and the exclusion of Beckmesser's
pedantry, through the emergence and expression of a people's
natural voice—this voice of the crowd has been there from the
beginning, but it brought to its full unity only by Walther's natural
genius.
This strident, triumphal, univocity of the crowd (distinct from
Walther's natural melodies) and the exclusion of the archaic
Beckmesser is precisely what was highlighted and given specific
inflection by performance in a Nazi setting. In such a setting, we see
the triumphal univocity as the identification of a mass, instead of a
public. In fact, it is difficult and ought to be difficult to see the crowd
in Meistersinger as anything but a mass. This is not to argue that
identification with the mass, or sympathy with it, is the point of the
final scene, let alone the entire opera—I do not think that the Nazi's
were correct to reduce Meistersinger to this.[19] But it seems to me
that the disturbing element is clearly there in the stridency,
triumphalism, and univocity, achieved only through exclusion, of the
music itself. What is made of this element depends on the plausible
story one tells, either through critical interpretation or through
performance, about the music itself.
The overcoming of opposition in Tristan is of course strikingly
different. There is no sense of mass in Tristan and Isolde's "triumph"
over the order of the world. Though an overwhelming desire and
longing are present and persist throughout, they are brought out
with constant musical and emotional shifting. The final resolution
doesn't overcome the world and it doesn't incite a crowd to
adoration, self affirmation, or mass triumphalism. It makes the world
irrelevant through the transfiguration of Tristan's and Isolde's
longing in death. The work is staunchly opposed to the trouble-free
synthesis of individuals and society, or even a trouble-free synthesis
of a conflicted individual. Though one might argue that the same can
be said of Meistersinger, much more argumentative work would
need to be done to overcome the apparently strident syntheses.
That is, it is much easier to generate a plausible story whose
elements are uncontroversially non-political in the case of Tristan
than it is in the case of Meistersinger.
7. Coda
Description and evaluation of performances provide us with a
particularly clear view of some of the shortcomings of formalist
accounts of music. Kivy's insight into the role of performances in our
coming to understand music, combined with his rich descriptions of
performances of works, serves to undermine his own formalism. The
audience at the Israel Festival understood what Barenboim described
in his performance and contested his account. Nobody suggested
that as "music alone" it had nothing to do with "the world of the
world."[20] Barenboim argues that we ought to listen to Wagner's
music alone, and that it has something else to do with the world of
the world than many people in Israel and around the world think it
does. What is fascinating about Barenboim's performance is that the

political context is directly relevant to his musical point that the
music itself does not contain Wagner's repugnant politics. Had the
performance just assumed the general formalist point, Barenboim,
or anybody else, would have no reason to call such attention to the
fact that he was performing Wagner in Israel. The commitment to
listen to the music itself, and give oneself over to the world of
"infinite longing" opened by Wagner's Tristan, asks audience
members to put aside their "terrible associations." It asks them to
commit to entering into the musical world and leave behind, for the
time being, experiences that most Israelis would consider
constitutive of their identities. Barenboim and his audience were
perfectly correct to see his performance as a politically charged
though nevertheless a musical gesture.
It is relatively uncontroversial that part of the role of performance is
to challenge our understanding of a work. What I have suggested
here is that this challenge not infrequently goes both wider and
deeper than formalism can countenance. Musical performance often
presents us with hard cases that force us to question what is
musical, what is part of a work, what role music can play for us,
what role music does play for us, what commitments I must have to
listen the way I do. Barenboim's performance of Wagner in
Jerusalem directly raised all of these questions and offered answers
to some of them. It is not possible to make sense of the significance
of hard cases in performance practice without leaving open the sorts
of things that might be musically relevant. In Israel, Barenboim
made vivid the depth and breadth of a commitment to hearing
music alone in a way that could not have been done elsewhere. His
performance of Wagner involved political, moral, and historical
commitments all of which inform and reveal a conception of the
work itself. Barenboim made a powerful statement about Wagner, or
at least about Tristan, that could not have been made elsewhere.
Whether his story about Wagner and Israel is a plausible one is still
an open question to be settled only in the ongoing deliberation in the
sphere of the musical public.[21]
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